Federalism and Education: Ongoing Challenges and Policy Strategies in Ten Countries by Kenneth K. Wong

Author:Kenneth K. Wong
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Information Age Publishing
Published: 2018-02-18T19:31:04+00:00

Chapter 7

The Italian Education System

Constitutional Design, Organization

and Policy-Making

Elisabeth Alber and Martina Trettel1

1. Introduction

No univocal pattern can be found when it comes to dealing with the distribution of competencies in the field of education in federal and regional countries. On the one side, there are States like the US and Canada in which centripetal wind is blowing (McGuinn, 2012): competencies in education as well as the implementation of education policies are re-allocated to the central level in order to guarantee efficiency and unity within the State-wide education system. On the other side, there are States in which the need is exactly the opposite: governance schemes in education are legislatively, administratively and financially ever more decentralized due to structural reforms and in response of claims by constituent units within a State. This is the case in Italy.

With regard to Italy’s State structure, it is important to recall that in 1948, the Italian Constitution (ItConst) altogether foresaw twenty regions (art. 131 ItConst) with fifteen regions2 relying on an ordinary mechanism of power-sharing and five regions3 on a special mechanism of power-sharing (art. 116 ItConst). Such a constitutional design translated into a highly asymmetric system combining moderate regionalism in most areas of the Italian State with peaks of advanced federal traits in some peripheral special regions. However, the regionalist two-track constitutional design did not properly dismantle Italy’s unitary tradition and its centralist political governance,4 because ordinary regions were only created in the beginning of the 1970s. Moreover, after the creation of ordinary regions, many attempts at devolution of powers from the central to the regional level initially failed. It took multiple decades to devolve legislative competencies from the central State level to the regional one.

Today, the gap between ordinary and special regions is still present with regard to both autonomy arrangements and policy-making (Palermo, 2008). As a general rule, Northern regions are calling for more autonomy while Southern regions are reluctant to do so because of fears of worsening cleavages over economic and living standards. Following the gradual process of regional emancipation in the 1990s, the constitutional reform of 2001 introduced a main element of a federal State design: wide ranging legislative powers for all regions. Since 2001, regions have been entitled to legislate in all areas not expressly reserved to the exclusive power of the State nor to the concurrent legislation. However, in absence of genuine federal political culture both at the central and regional level and with the 2008–2009 financial crisis straining the political system, there has been an increase of judicial litigation and an extensive use of concurrent powers by the central State. The Constitutional Court (ConstCourt) became a key player in resolving numerous conflicts on competence sharing between the State and both ordinary and special regions, and it has increasingly decided to the detriment of the regions’ autonomy.

Keeping this in mind, the paper in Part 2 discusses relevant constitutional provisions, basic facts and the evolution of the Italian education system. Part 3 elucidates details as to the design and

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